The paper estimates the e¤ect of NAFTA's rules of origin (ROO) on Mexican access to the US market simultaneously with the endogenous determination of ROOs. The …rst equation determines Mexico's NAFTA (preferential) exports to the US as a function of, inter alia, the rate of tari¤ preference and Estevadeordal's qualitative index of ROO strictness. The second equation determines ROO strictness on the basis of a Grossman-Helpman model identifying channels through which lobbying by US intermediate-good producers leads to deep preferences and sti¤ rules of origin in downstream sectors. Estimates from the …rst equation suggest that ROOs largely o¤set the market-access bene…t of tari¤ preferences, while estimates from the second equation suggest that the creation of a captive market for upstream intermediate-good producers is indeed one of their political determinants. JEL classi…cation numbers: F10, F13, F15
Introduction
With the proliferation of preferential trading agreements over the last two decades, considerable attention has been devoted to assessing their e¤ect on market access. Notwithstanding the fact that GATT Article XXIV, para. 8(b) requires the removal of trade barriers on "substantially all trade" in Free-Trade Agreements (FTAs), in reality numerous barriers to intra-bloc trade are often left intact or even erected as part of the agreements. Prominent among those barriers are Rules of Origin (ROOs) which are included in every FTA. In principle, ROOs are meant to prevent the trans-shipment of goods imported into the area via member states with low external tari¤s into member states with higher ones. In practice, these rules often have the e¤ect of exporting protection from high-tari¤ members to low-tari¤ ones, as pointed out by Krueger and Krishna (1995) and Krueger (1997) . This interpretation of ROOs seems particularly relevant in North-South agreements in which a Northern country wants to protect an upstream, capital-intensive sector without incurring the welfare of cost of protecting the whole value chain. Preferential trade liberalization-cum-ROOs can be used to create a captive market for the upstream industry by forcing the Southern partner's …nal-good producers to source in the North (rather than seeking the most e¢cient suppliers in the rest of the world). If …nal-good assembly is relatively labor-intensive, partnering with a relatively labor-abundant Southern country reduces the welfare cost of protection compared to protecting the whole value chain in the North.
Based on this type of reasoning, the literature has stressed the tradediverting e¤ect of ROOs and, more generally, their potential to create inef…ciencies (Falvey and Reed, 2000) . However, the recent political-economy literature has also highlighted the fact that ROOs can sometimes make welfare-enhancing bilateral agreements politically feasible in circumstances where they would'nt be without them (Panagaryia and Duttagupta, 2000) .
While the theoretical analysis of ROOs has made considerable strides since Krueger's pioneering work, their empirical analysis is still in its infancy, partly because their complex legal nature makes measurement di¢cult. Estevadeordal (2000) recently overcame this di¢culty by creating a qualitative index of ROO strictness. Using the fact that most ROOs are -at least in recent agreements-expressed as a required change in tari¤ heading at various levels of aggregation, Estevadeordal's index takes values that increase in the level of aggregation of the required change, the idea being that a change at a more aggregate level is "wider" and hence the required rule of origin is more stringent. On the basis of his index, he identi…ed a strong negative e¤ect of NAFTA's ROOs on Mexican market access. Using the same index, Anson et al. (2003) showed that the e¤ect of NAFTA's tari¤ preferences is systematically reduced by ROOs.
However, as Estevadeordal (2000) and Sanguinetti (2003) point out, it is di¢cult to assess the e¤ect of ROOs on market access without taking into account the fact that they are themselves endogenous. ROOs result from a political bargaining process that is itself bound to be a¤ected by trade patterns, creating a simultaneity problem. Rather than relying on instrumental variable techniques to deal with the resulting endogeneity bias, we take the problem as a starting point for a political-economy analysis of the determination of ROOs.
In order to keep the story analytically tractable, we focus on one speci…c type of political issues. Namely, we assume that US intermediate-good interests wish to use NAFTA to create a captive market in Mexico. The mechanism consists of inducing, via ROOs, Mexican …nal-good makers to source in the US in order to qualify for preferential access. This clearly reduces the degree of e¤ective protection that access to the protected US …nal-good market confers to Mexican assemblers. We assume that Mexico is on its "participation constraint", i.e. that e¤ective protection, once taken into account the rule of origin, is reduced to zero for Mexican assemblers (this assumption is in accordance with the results of Cadot et al., 2001 ). In other words, Mexican assemblers are indi¤erent between shipping through NAFTA (and complying to the rule of origin) and shipping through the Most Favored Nation regime. As deep tari¤ preferences make strict ROOs more palatable for the Mexican side, the two are correlated along Mexico's participation constraint. Thus, upstream intermediate-good producers in the US might lobby for deep tari¤ preferences downstream, because, alongside the South Participation constraint, tari¤ preferences buy sti¤er ROOs. We take this lobbying to be the driving force behind the determination of ROOs, and the analytical framework that we adopt to explore the issue is a simpli…ed version of Grossman and Helpman (1994) highlighting vertical linkages.
We estimate the …rst-order condition from the political-economy model simultaneously with a market-access equation in which Mexican exports to the United States under NAFTA's preferential regime are functions, inter alia, of tari¤ preferences and ROOs. NAFTA provides a laboratory experiment to test the e¤ect of ROOs. It is the quintessential example of the North-South agreement due to the comprehensive tari¤ liberalization built in the agreement and the fact that member countries share borders, eliminating the need to account for distance as in traditional gravity exercises. We construct a panel dataset with information dating back to 1989 on commodity imports from Mexico to United States under di¤erent preferential programs. The data was compiled mostly from USITC sources at the 6-digit HS disaggregation level and contains information on tari¤ preferences (GSP and NAFTA rates) granted by the United States to Mexico. From 1989 to 1994, Mexico's exports to the United Stated bene…ted from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), after which this regime was overhauled by NAFTA. The data on rules of origin comes from Estevadeordal (2000) .
The results are in conformity with the model's predictions. All variables are signi…cant -most of them at the 1% level-and have the expected signs. Tari¤ preferences and ROOs exert positive and negative in ‡uences respectively on Mexican exports, and the key variable in ‡uencing endogenouslydetermined ROOs -a product of input-output coe¢cients and US intermediate exports to Mexico-has the predicted sign and is signi…cant at the 1% level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the political-economy model and characterizes its equilibrium. Section 3 presents prima-facie evidence in support of the model's basic assumptions. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology and results, and section 5 concludes.
Politically-determined ROOs
This section uses a simple, stripped-down political-economy model to illustrate the simultaneous determination of tari¤ preferences and ROOs. Although the model borrows from Grossman and Helpman (1994) the appearance of a general-equilibrium model, it is best thought of as a partialequilibrium one as interindustry linkages are nonexistant except for the vertical linkages around which the discussion is centered.
The economy
Consider a PTA formed by two small economies, North (N) and South (S). The North produces, under increasing cost, an intermediate good denoted by the subscript I and exports it to the South which uses it to assemble a …nal good denoted by the subscript F . Southern supply of the …nal good is not enough to cover the North's consumption at its tari¤-ridden price, so the North also imports from the rest of the world. The South imports all its own consumption of the …nal good from the rest of the world and exports all its production to the North.
Households in both countries consume the …nal good and an aggregate of all other goods, which also serves as numeraire, under identical and quasilinear preferences. Let c F and c 0 denote respectively the quantities of …nal and 'other' goods consumed by a representative consumer in either country. The utility function is
where u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0. The …nal good is produced by combining value added and the intermediate good. Value added is created with intersectorally mobile labor`and speci…c capital · under a technology f(`; ·). The technology producing the …nal good, into which the value-added production function is nested, is of the Leontie¤ type with input-output coe¢cient a IF . Letting y F and x I stand respectively for the …nal-good output and quantity of intermediate good consumed in the process,
Let p ¤ I and p ¤ F be respectively the intermediate and …nal goods' world prices. Under free trade, given the technology postulated, the 'net price' out of which a Southern producer can remunerate value added (wages and pro…ts) is
With the stock of speci…c capital …xed, the technology f which generates value added displays diminishing returns on labor. The supply of value added is therefore upward sloping in its net price p ¤ , and economic rents accrue to owners of speci…c capital, who are assumed to be the industry's residual claimants. The rest of the economy uses only labor under constant returns to scale, which …xes the wage rate. Given this assumption, the model becomes a quasi-partial equilibrium one. In this setting, Southern …nal-good producers' surplus under free trade, ¼ ¤ F , is a monotone increasing function of p
Letting p be generic notation for the net price, (p ¡ p ¤ )=p is the e¤ective rate of protection granted to Southern producers when selling on the Northern market. 1 The intermediate good is produced in the North with value-added only under a technology similar to f . Letting y I be its output, producer surplus is
Finally, we will measure the intermediate good in units that make its world price p ¤ I equal to one, and we will treat its supply elasticity in the North, " I´pI y 0 I =y I , as a constant.
The politics
In order to keep things simple, we will treat MFN (external) tari¤s on the …nal and intermediate goods as predetermined to the PTA and hence parametric. Northern tari¤s are respectively t N F and t N I and Southern ones t S F and t S I . In order to focus on the e¤ects of Northern tari¤s and ROOs, we will set t 
That is, Southern producers can sell under the PTA's preferential regime if they satisfy the ROO. If not, they sell under the MFN regime, i.e. at the world price. 1 Might perhaps be explained in more detail. 2 Note that endogenous determination of MFN tari¤s would yield t S I = t N F = 0 given that the South does not produce the intermediate good and the North does not produce the …nal one. However if specialization is a result of the PTA and MFN tari¤s are predetermined to it (say, because they are negotiated in multilateral rounds and thus constitute valuable bargaining chips), they will not be eliminated after the PTA's formation.
Given the ROO, Southern producers selling under the preferential regime source a proportion r of their intermediate good in the North. The price of the value-added net price is thus
The politics is described by a Grosssman-Helpman game in which the relevant producer lobby faces its government with a contribution schedule C i (±; r), i = I; F , conditioned on the policy variables of interest to it, ± and r. The function C has the 'truthfulness' property that where the subscript e designates equilibrium values. Note that there is only one lobby in each country, so that the standard common-agency game degenerates into a single principal-agent game. Withouth any hidden action, the principal (the lobby) is then able to appropriate all the rents from protection. Any equilibrium will then have the property that the government is just indi¤erent between implementing the policy preferred by the lobby and implementing its own (free trade). In other words, the lobby's contribution just compensates the e¢ciency loss generated by trade protection. Member-state governments set ± and r in a cooperative game, i.e. at the levels that maximize their joint 'surplus'. Surplus is measured, in each country, by a political objective function taking the form of a linear combination of welfare and lobby contributions. That is,
The weight on welfare, a, is assumed to be the same in both countries. Extensions are straightforward. We consider two ways of splitting the joint surplus.
Case 1: The Northern government appropriates all the surplus and leaves the Southern government on its 'participation constraint'. Given that the South's consumption of the …nal good is always priced at p ¤ F , consumer surplus is una¤ected by changes in either ¿ or r. Moreover, under the postulated political game, there is complete pass-through from the equilibrium value of the function G to the equilibrium level of pro…ts of …nal-good producers (since the producers' lobby appropriates all the rents). Therefore the South's participation constraint is de…ned by the fact that the equilibrium net price of value added is equal to what it would be without the FTA, i.e. p = p ¤ :We will call this the PC solution.
Case 2: Nash bargaining solution with no PTA (i.e. no tari¤ preferences and no rules of origin) as the threat point. We will call this the NB solution.
Equilibrium
ROOs have the e¤ect of segmenting the intermediate good's market in the trading bloc. Southern manufacturers of the …nal good selling on their home market are not a¤ected by the ROO and consequently will under no conditions buy the intermediate at more than its world price (given that the South does not protect the intermediate good by assumption). Southern manufacturers selling on the Northern market, by contrast, must comply with the ROO if they want to bene…t from the preferential regime. If they do, the market on which they buy their intermediate good is a 'closed-economy' market where Northern supply must match Southern demand without recourse to ROW imports. We now determine the price prevailing on that market.
Price determination With their home market unprotected, Southern manufacturers sell all their output on the protected Northern market where they enjoy preferential access. Suppose that p I > p ¤ I . In equilibrium, it will be. The ROO's domestic content is then binding, which means that a proportion r of the South's intermediate-good demand will be sourced 'locally' (in the North). The market-clearing condition determining the intermediate good's domestic price is thus that the local demand induced by the ROO, ra IF y F (p), be equal to the supply, i.e.
where, as before, y F is the South's …nal-good production and y I is the North's intermediate-good production.
, the ROO is not binding, which means that the North's supply of the intermediate good is su¢cient to satisfy the South's needs and more. We will henceforth disregard this case and suppose that the intermediate good's price determined by (7) is larger than its tari¤-ridden price in the North.
PC solution
Written in full, the problem of maximizing the joint surplus under the South's participation constraint is
As an intermediate step before solving problem (9), we calculate two derivatives treating r as predetermined: dp I =dr and d±=dr. Di¤erentiating totally (6), (7) and (8) with respect to p I , ± and r and rearranging gives d± = a IF ¢p I dr + ra IF dp I a IF y F dr + ra IF y 0 F dp = y 0 I dp I or dp
where " I is the intermediate good's supply elasticity -which we will henceforth treat as constant-and
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Note that the ambiguity of the e¤ect of ROOs on the intermediate good's price, noted by Ju and Krishna (1998, 2000) does not apply here because, by construction, along the South's participation constraint value-added in the …nal-good sector cannot go down, so (given the Leontie¤ technology) neither can output. Thus, ROOs cannot become so sti¤ as to become self-defeating.
We are now in a position to solve problem (9) . Combining the constraint on ± with the participation constraint gives
Letting¸and ¹ be two Lagrange multipliers, we have
1 ¡ r¸0;¸¸0;¸(1 ¡ r) = 0;
We now construct the expression for dG=dr, which has two components: a contribution e¤ect and a welfare e¤ect.
Contribution e¤ect Using Hotelling's lemma and the contribution function's truthfulness property, we have, in a neighborhood of the equilibrium,
Thus, left to itself (i.e. absent any welfare consideration) the Northern intermediate-good lobby would be willing to push ROOs to a corner solution (namely, whatever the South will take).
Combining (13) and (11), it is apparent that the Northern intermediategood lobby is willing to contribute in favor of 'deep' tari¤ preference in the downstream sector because, along the South's participation constraint, tari¤ preference buys sti¤er ROOs which in turn are advantageous to the intermediate-good sector.
Welfare e¤ect Let m F be the North's imports of …nal goods from the South and m ¤ F its imports of …nal goods from the rest of the world. Under quasilinear preferences, Northern welfare is the sum of income (from pro…ts and tari¤ revenue) and consumer surplus, which by virtue of (1) comes only from consumption of the …nal good. That is,
Note that, along the South's participation constraint, p is constant and, hence, so is y F . Thus, treating p I and ± as endogenous variables along the problem's constraints,
Using the fact that, by (7), a IF y F = y I =r, this becomes
Combining the contribution e¤ect with the welfare e¤ect gives
Under the …rst-order condition, this expression is equal to zero so, after simplifying, p I ¢p I = a" I :
Using (8) to retrieve a semi-closed form for r (it is not a real closed form since p I is on the RHS) gives
Re-introducing the inequality constraints, the solution is thus
: With several inputs indexed by i and one output indexed by j, it is easily veri…ed that (16) becomes
3 Quantity and price e¤ects: prima-facie evidence
Regional Intensity of Trade
Let x ijk be country i's exports of good (or class of goods) k to country (or region) j, let x ij = P k x ijk country i's exports to j aggregated over all commodities, x ik = P j x ijk country i's exports of good k to the world, and x i = P j P k x ijk country i's total exports aggregated over destination and commodities.
The Regional Intensity of Trade (RIT) index, which measures the share of a region in i's exports of a good relative to the share of that region in i's overall exports, is
Let i be the US and j be Mexico. Let also k = I denote intermediate goods (codes 01 and 02 in the WTO's nomenclature) and k = F …nal ones (code 03 in the WTO's nomenclature), and de…ne
and similarly for x ijF . Letting
and similarly for R ijF The hypothesis to be tested is that NAFTA has specialized Mexico-US trade into a 'vertical' exchange of the o¤shore-assembly type whereby the US ships semi-…nished goods for …nal assembly in Mexico and then reimports them as …nished products [Francois (2003) ]. Under that hypothesis, if the argument t denotes a year post NAFTA (2000) and 0 a year prior to NAFTA (1993) , the hypothesis to be tested is
Tables 1a-1b Regional intensities of trade, 1992 and 2000 Table 1 shows that there is indeed an increase in the regional intensity of trade in the expected direction, US exports specializing in input more than Mexican exports.
Price e¤ects
We measure p
using unit values, provided by the USITC's online database, of goods imported into the US from Asia not claiming any special program (a proxy for world prices at the US border) augmented by the US's MFN tari¤ (also from the USITC's database). We measure e p i k using the unit values of the same goods for export into Mexico. If ROOs have, as claimed, the e¤ect of segmenting the market for intermediate goods, raising their price when used for the production of goods re-exported into the US, the ratio of the two should be higher, ceteris paribus, for intermediate goods than for …nal ones. We di¤erentiate between intermediate and …nal goods using the WTO's classi…cation of goods into raw materials, semi-…nished goods, and fully processed goods. Ignoring CIF/FOB di¤erences, the hypothesis to be tested is thus°I´p Evidence is provided in Table 2 . 
Empirical estimation
The set of equations to be estimated is
where± j is the rate of preference granted to good j under NAFTA, r j is Estevadeordal's (2000) qualitative index of ROO strictness and x j is a supplyside determinant proxied by Mexican exports to the rest of the world, and, putting (17) in logs,
Alternatively, noting that, by (10)
, the equation to be estimated becomes 
Results
Results are shown in Tables 3-7. All estimates are signi…cant at the 1% level and have the expected sign. Table 4 shows that Mexico's exports to the US under NAFTA are enhanced by the preferential tari¤ but there is a countervailing e¤ect going through the restrictiveness of rules of origin. Table 4 con…rms this …nding with an alternative de…nition of Rules of origin where we used directly the primary set of dummies depending on the type of substantial transformation criteria classi…cation required by the rule (a change of tari¤ classi…cation (CTC) at the chapter, heading, sub-heading or item levels, the existence of exceptions to the CTC, a minimum requirement of regional value content, or a technological test requirement). Again, rules of origin have a negative impact of the volume of preferential trade. Changes of heading and changes of chapters that represent respectively 40 and 54 percent of the tari¤ lines (Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2003) are quite detrimental in that respect. Exceptions to the rule alleviate the negative impact of rules of origin on trade (meaning that these exceptions are actually somekind of allowances). Table 3-4 Regression results, ROOs and Utilization Rates Table 5 introduces interaction terms between the restrictiveness index and year dummies. Contrary to expectations, results do not seem to suggest a strong learning curve. Of course, most of the action is likely to happen in some speci…c sectors as was the case for the bilateral trade between Canada and the United States (see Estevadeordal and Suominen, …gure 1). Tables 5-6 here   Table 6 takes as the dependent variable, the utilization rate, that is, the ratio of Mexican preferential imports over total Mexican imports. The use of a logistic regression is supported by …gure 1 (histogram of utilization rates) that shows that most goods at the HS-6 digit level of disagregation are either never traded through the NAFTA regime or always traded through the preferential scheme. The regression in table 6 exhibit the same pattern: rules of origin counterbalances the positive e¤ect of preferential tari¤s on Mexican trade.
Finally, Table 7 shows regression results for the political determination of ROOs, i.e. equation (20) in the model. The results are consistent with the theory's prediction. The variable labeled "upstream" which stands for P i a ij y i has a negative and signi…cant coe¢cient. Moreover, tari¤ preferences come out as a positive in ‡uence on ROOs at the tari¤-line level, lending support to the participation-constraint approach adopted here.
Concluding remarks
Our results highlight the deleterious e¤ect of rules of origin on the bene…ts generated by preferential trade liberalization, in terms of market access, for Southern partners. These results, which are in conformity with the …ndings of the recent literature, suggest that ROOs should indeed be viewed as an economically sensitive item rather than a technical one in the agenda of any future bilateral trade negotiations. However, our results have more of a positive than normative ‡avour. We use a standard model of endogenous trade policy -Grossman and Helpman's common-agency model-to explore the logic of ROO determination. On the assumption that the Mexican side is on its "participation constraint", i.e. that the rate of e¤ective protection conferred to Mexican …nal-good producers by the simultaneous use of tari¤ preferences and ROOs is just about zero, the model shows that preferencescum-ROOs amount to a pure transfer from US taxpayers to intermediategood producers, i.e. to a hidden export subsidy.
Empirically, the model suggests the inclusion, among the right-hand side variables of the second equation (ROO determination), of the product of input-output coe¢cients by US intermediate sales to Mexico. This unintuitive prediction provides a test of the approach's validity, since it is di¢cult to think of an alternative theoretical approach that would lead to the inclusion of that particular algebraic term. Empirical results are in striking conformity with the model's predictions. In sum, they suggest that the use of NAFTA to create a captive market for US intermediates was indeed one of the forces shaping the agreement's rules of origin. 
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